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1. Introduction 
 
Genetic determinism is the idea that many significant human characteristics are rendered 
inevitable by the presence of certain genes; that it is futile to attempt to modify criminal 
behavior or obesity or alcoholism by any means other than genetic manipulation. Recent 
discussion of human cloning has revealed how real a possibility genetic determinism 
seems to many people. Surveying this discussion, developmental biologist Lewis Wolpert 
was amused to see so many ‘moralists who denied that genes have an important effect on 
behavior now saying that a cloned individual’s behavior will be entirely determined by 
their genetic make-up’ (Wolpert, 1998). His observation is accurate, and the vehemence 
of many attacks on behavioral genetics probably reflects an underlying belief that if genes 
affect behavior at all, then they must determine it. In fact, genes are very unlikely to be 
deterministic causes of behavior, for reasons I will come to in a moment. But if genetic 
determinism is unlikely to be true, why are we as a community so afraid of it? Wolpert 
seems to think that moral and political commentators on biology are simply ignorant, but 
the facts of which they are supposedly ignorant have been widely available for a very long 
time. Perhaps there is more to the strange persistence of genetic determinism. 
 
The psychologist Susan Oyama has famously compared arguing against genetic 
determinism to battling the undead: 
 
“But wait,” the exasperated reader cries, “everyone nowadays knows that 
development is a matter of interaction. You’re beating a dead horse. 
 I reply, “I would like nothing better than to stop beating him, but every 
time I think I am free of him he kicks me and does rude things to the intellectual 
and political environment. He seems to be a phantom horse with a thousand 
incarnations, and he gets more subtle each time around. ... What we need here, to 
switch metaphors in midstream, is the stake-in-the-heart move, and the heart is the 
notion that some influences are more equal than others, that form, or its modern 
agent, information, exists before the interactions in which it appears and must be 
transmitted to the organism either through the genes or by the environment. 
(Oyama, 1985: 26-7) 
 
Oyama suggests that genetic determinism is inherent in the way we currently represent 
genes and what genes do1. As long as genes are represented as containing information 
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1 Oyama’s influential book The Ontogeny of Information (Oyama, 1985), from which the above quotation is 
drawn, has recently been reprinted with a new introduction by Richard Lewontin (Oyama, 2000b), as have 
about how the organism will develop, they will continue to be regarded as determining 
causes no matter how much evidence exists to the contrary. The denial that 
developmental information is localized in the genes is the ‘stake in the heart’ that will lay 
the vampire of genetic determinism to rest.  
 
Philip Kitcher has strongly disputed Oyama’s diagnosis, arguing that the conventional 
‘interactionist’ perspective on development is the correct framework for understanding 
the role of the genes in development. The persistence of genetic determinism is 
explained, not by any conceptual problem in current representations of genetic causation, 
but by two much simpler facts: the universal human preference for simple explanations 
over complex ones and the sheer difficulty of communicating complex science to a wider 
audience. He argues further that calls for radical new approaches to understanding the 
role of the genes in development will only alienate working scientists from efforts to take 
account of non-genetic factors in development: 
 
‘critics of conclusions about the important effects of genotype on phenotype will 
be seen as taking refuge in nebulous appeals for a new general view of causation 
of behavior and as driven to this predicament solely by their sense of outrage at 
the determinist claims’ (Kitcher, 2001: 408) 
 
While acknowledging the legitimacy of many of Kitcher’s observations, I believe that 
Oyama’s view is substantially correct. In this paper I try to support the Oyama diagnosis 
in three main ways. I break down genetic determinism into a number of component 
fallacies and argue that each is made more plausible by arguments that rest essentially on 
attributing semantic properties to the gene. I use data from an empirical study of 
biologists to document an apparent association between endorsing informational 
representations of the gene and being relatively uninterested in contextual effects on gene 
expression. I do not want to place too much weight on this one, preliminary result, but it 
does suggests that efforts to determine whether Oyama is correct need not be confined to 
philosophical argument: the claim that genetic determinism is caused by a certain 
representation of the gene can be bolstered by documenting a correlation between 
determinist thinking and that representation. Finally, I suggest that Kitcher is mistaken in 
thinking that ‘neither Lewontin’s “dialectical biology” nor Oyama’s “developmental 
systems theory” offer anything that aspiring researchers can put to work’ (Kitcher, 2001: 
408). There is a substantial research tradition in developmental psychobiology that fits the 
prescriptions of developmental systems theory (DST) for the simple reason that DST is an 
attempt to abstract a theoretical framework from research in that tradition. Philosophers 
of science and other commentators on the biological sciences need to become more aware 
of this tradition and its achievements. Popular presentations of those achievements may 
also offer a practical route to improving public understanding of the role of the genes in 
development. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
many of her papers (Oyama, 2000a). Another recent collection contains new and classic papers by Oyama 
and other authors on the developmental systems approach (Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray, 2001). 
2. What is genetic determinism?  
 
The concept of ‘innateness’ was inherited by the Darwinian tradition from natural 
theology (Richards, 1987). In its theological incarnation, innate behavior is behavior that 
cannot be explained by an animal’s use of reason. Innate behavior shows the hand of 
divine providence, equipping the organism in advance for the challenges that it will face 
when it is born. Complex instincts like those of the social insects provided the natural 
theologians of the early nineteenth century with numerous ‘evidences of Christianity’. In 
the Darwinian incarnation of innateness, natural selection takes the place of God in 
explaining how organisms can manifest behavior that is adaptive when they have had no 
opportunity to learn that behavior. The existence of complex, instinctive behaviors 
provides ‘evidences of evolution’. The founders of ethology, particularly Konrad Lorenz, 
continued this tradition with their extensive use of the ‘deprivation experiment’. 
Behaviors that develop when the organism is experimentally deprived of the opportunity 
to learn are innate whilst those that fail to develop are acquired. But it has been agreed for 
a several decades that a dichotomy between innate behavior and acquired behavior makes 
little sense. All behaviors have both genetic and non-genetic causes. For any behavior 
there will be some genetic modifications that stop in occurring and some non-genetic 
modifications that stop it occurring. On the one hand, social deprivation of young rhesus 
monkeys will prevent them from displaying their ‘innate’ sexual behaviors as adults 
(Harlow, Dodsworth, & Harlow, 1965). On the other hand, a rat and a bird will emerge 
from an identical program of conditioning having learnt very different behaviors: their 
genetic endowment affects what is ‘acquired’ (Garcia, McGowan, & Green, 1972). 
Similar examples formed the empirical core of Daniel Lehrmann’s influential critique of 
the use of the innateness concept by early ethologists (Lehrman, 1953), a critique that was 
widely accepted. Ethologists came to realize that questions about the development of a 
behavior and questions about its evolution should not be conflated (Tinbergen, 1963). 
Many evolutionary adaptations require complex and highly specific inputs from the 
environment, and not all traits that are robust in the face of variations in the 
developmental environment are evolutionary adaptations. Even Konrad Lorenz 
grudgingly admitted that he had offered an overly simplistic ‘understanding of the 
relations between phylogenetic adaptation and adaptive modifications of behaviour.  It 
was Lehrman's (1953) critique which, by a somewhat devious route, brought the full 
realisation of these relations to me.’ (Lorenz, 1965: 80) 
 
Once it is accepted that all traits develop as a result of the interaction of genetic and non-
genetic factors, genetic determinism becomes a view about how these factors interact. 
This view can be conveniently represented using  ‘norms of reaction’ - graphical 
representations of a phenotypic variable as a function of genotypic and environmental 
variables. The strongest form of genetic determinism claims that a norm of reaction show 
no response to the environmental variable. An organism needs an environment for the 
trait to develop, but it doesn’t matter which environment (Figure 1). Kitcher suggests that 
some modern genetic determinists think norms of reaction have this form, but only in 
some limited, but perhaps contextually important, range of environments. Someone might 
claim, for example, that ‘genetic diseases’ develop in any environment except those 
specifically structured as clinical interventions to cure the disease.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. A norm of reaction vindicating genetic determinism 
 
 
A more moderate form of genetic determinism claims that genetic and environmental 
factors interact additively (Figure 2). Genotype makes a constant difference across some 
range of environment. A determinist picture of the relationship between genetic factors 
and education in the determination of IQ might take this form.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Pure additive interaction between genotype and environment 
 
 
Perhaps the single most influential contribution to the literature on the interpretation of 
behavioral genetics is Richard Lewontin paper ‘The analysis of variance and the analysis 
of causes’ (Lewontin, 1974). Lewontin pointed out that the empirical evidence suggests 
that actual norms of reaction are likely to be non-additive (Figure 3). In that case, it 
makes no sense to talk of a particular genotype ‘determining’ a particular phenotypic 
difference. Genotype and environment jointly determine the outcome in the 
straightforward sense that the effect of each factor on the outcome is a function of the 
particular value taken by the other factor. Nor, as Lewontin further points out, does it 
make any sense in the context of Figure 3 to perform an analysis of variance on trait 
differences in a population and interpret the resulting statistic as indicating the percentage 
contribution of genes and environment to the trait. The very same causal system can 
produce a pattern of trait differences that correlate 100% with the environmental factor (if 
everyone lives in the environment where the lines cross) or correlate strongly with 
genotype (if everyone lives at one extreme of the graph). According to Lewontin and 
many others, because gene-environment interactions are typically non-additive, 
heritability studies do not yield information about the relative importance of genetic and 
environmental developmental factors in the actual causal process that gives rise to a 
phenotypic trait. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Non-additive interaction between genotype and environment 
 
 
Figures 1 and 2 represent two senses in which a genotype can be said to ‘determine’ a 
trait or a trait difference. For Kitcher, genetic determinism as a general intellectual 
position is simply the claim that many norms of variation have ‘determinist’ shapes. If 
this claim is true, then for many scientific purposes the role of the environment in 
producing traits or trait differences can be neglected. Hence, according to Kitcher genetic 
determinism arises from the widespread and understandable human desire for simple, 
mono-causal explanations. His antidote to genetic determinism is the careful, case-by-
case investigation of how genetic and environmental factors interact to determine 
phenotypes. Kitcher is confident that in many cases, genetic determinism will prove to be 
false. He sees behavioral genetic research as the most scientifically tractable approach to 
such investigations. Specific genetic loci that are shown to correlate with behavioral traits 
in certain environments provide valuable entry points to the complex molecular pathways 
that construct the behavior. Once these pathways are understood, Kitcher is confident that 
the importance of non-genetic factors will become evident. I discuss in section six some 
other scientific approaches to developmental interactions that I take to be at least equally 
tractable and that have been unduly neglected by Kitcher and other commentators.  
 
It is hard to disagree with Kitcher that the careful elucidation of specific developmental 
pathways will provide evidence bearing on the issue of genetic determinism. I also share 
his confidence that in many cases the norm of reaction will turn out not to have a 
‘determinist’ shape. But I am less confident that simply publicizing more examples of 
non-additive gene-environment interaction will lay the specter of genetic determinism. 
Unlike Kitcher, Oyama sees the persistence of genetic determinism as a puzzling 
phenomenon that requires special explanation. Consider, for example, a footnote to 
Kitcher’s paper containing an anecdote about a leading population geneticist’s irritated 
response to the assertion by a behavioral geneticist that heritability figures reveal 
something about the role of genes in the development of behavioral traits. Heritability 
measures, Kitcher comments are ‘irrelevant’ and the fact that behavior geneticists persist 
in using them is ‘an unfortunate tic from which they cannot free themselves’ (Kitcher, 
2001: 413). It is this sort of anomaly that sends Oyama in search of a cause. Why do so 
many intelligent scientists appear to ignore facts that are well known to them, such as the 
likely non-additive interaction of genotypes and environment? For Oyama, ‘genetic 
determinism’ refers to something deeper than a pattern of interaction between genotype 
and environment that may or may not hold in any particular case. It is an underlying 
attitude to genes and their role in development that makes it hard to assimilate certain 
facts and easy to assimilate - or to assume - others. Genetic determinism is whatever it is 
that leads the unreflective to infer from evidence that genes have a causal role in the 
development of a trait that:  
 
 the prevalence of the trait in the population can never be reduced below the 
proportion of variance in the trait found to be correlated with genetic factors 
 
 development of the trait will be insensitive to environmental factors in 
development in rough proportion to 'how genetic' the trait is (the proportion of 
variance in the trait in some study population which is due to genetic factors) 
 
 a given genetic change will make a constant difference irrespective of the values 
of other developmental variables 
 
 as a consequence of the last point, the variance accounted for by genetic factors in 
one population can be safely extrapolated to other populations 
 
It is these and other, similar inferences that Oyama takes to result from the idea that genes 
contain information about the phenotypic outcomes of development. 
 
 
3. Information in biology 
 
Although biologists think of genes as key parts of the molecular machinery that 
assembles a protein product, they also think of them as instructions or programs for the 
production of particular phenotypic traits2. In popular science writing this second 
representation of the gene predominates, leading to assertions like the following: 
 
‘An organism's physiology and behaviour are dictated largely by its genes. And those 
genes are merely repositories of information written in a surprisingly similar manner to 
the one that computer scientists have devised for the storage and transmission of other 
information...[biology] is itself an information technology.’ (Economist, 1999: 97) 
 
This way of thinking about genes has its roots in Mendelian or transmission genetics - the 
discipline that first postulated genes. In the absence of any molecular understanding of the 
gene a tractable theoretical and experimental framework was constructed in which genes 
were identified by the phenotypic characters with which they correlated in breeding 
experiments. Developmental biology - the investigation of how characters seen in the 
parent are reconstructed in the offspring was put to one side in favor of a black box 
strategy in which genes, identified in the manner described, were treated as if the 
transmission of a chunk of chromosome explained in and of itself the ‘transmission’ of 
the phenotypic character. Making use of metaphors from the new sciences of information 
theory, cybernetics and computing, biologists came to describe genes as containing 
‘blueprints’, ‘programs’ and ‘instructions’ concerning the traits with which they correlate 
in breeding experiments (Kay, 2000; Keller, 1995). The results of the molecular 
revolution in biology have been explained to the general public almost entirely in these 
terms.  
 
The popular understanding of the nature of the molecular revolution, and the common 
metaphors used by scientists themselves when explaining their work, are in stark contrast 
to the views of many contemporary philosophers of biology. The biologist and 
philosopher Sahotra Sarkar has noted that, ‘there is no clear, technical notion of 
“information” in molecular biology.  It is little more than a metaphor that masquerades as 
a theoretical concept and ...leads to a misleading picture of possible explanations in 
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2001, 2002). Some exciting potential implications of the first, molecular way of thinking about genes are 
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molecular biology.’ (Sarkar, 1996:187). The leading philosopher of biology Peter 
Godfrey-Smith concludes that, ‘All the genes can code for, if they code for anything, is 
the primary structure (amino acid sequence) of a protein’ (Godfrey-Smith, 1999: 328). 
The point is not that there is no useful way to apply formalisms from the information 
sciences to the study of molecular developmental systems - there are many such ways. 
The point is that the facts of molecular developmental biology do not correspond to the 
popular idea that the genetic code is a language in which the genome contains instructions 
about phenotypes. Kenneth Schaffner has made this point by saying that there are no tiny 
‘traitunculi’ living in the genome (Schaffner, 1998). The slippage from a code for protein 
structure to a language for specifying phenotypes embodies a systematic confusion about 
the meaning of the term ‘information’. 
 
Concepts of information can be divided into two very broad classes, which Kim Sterelny 
and I have called ‘causal’3 and ‘intentional’ (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999: 101). Causal 
notions include the measure of quantity of information which is at the heart of the 
mathematical theory of communication as well as the measures found in algorithmic 
complexity theory and various notion of information content inspired by these 
mathematical measures of information quantity (e.g. (Dretske, 1981). The simplest causal 
accounts of the information content of a signal - what the signal is about - define the 
content as whatever the signal is reliably correlated with. Smoke contains information 
about fire because, as the saying goes, ‘where there’s smoke there’s fire’. The weakness 
of this causal account of information content - and of many of its more complex relatives 
- is that it makes information ubiquitous. As John Maynard Smith has noted: 
 
With this definition, there is no difficulty in saying that a gene carries information 
about adult form; an individual with the gene for achondroplasia will have short 
arms and legs. But we can equally well say that a baby's environment carries 
information about growth; if it is malnourished, it will be underweight. (Maynard 
Smith, 2000: 189) 
 
Maynard Smith concludes that a definition of information that can be used to capture the 
traditional idea that genes carry information while other developmental causes merely 
support the expression of that information will have to be a definition that includes an 
element of what philosophers refer to as ‘intentionality’.  
 
Intentional information is information in the sense derived from human thought and 
language. The distinctive feature of intentional information is that it can be false 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1989). The utterance ‘There are fairies at the bottom of my garden’, and 
the thought that accompanies it, have never occurred in response to the presence of fairies 
in someone’s garden, because fairies do not exist. But this has no effect on what the 
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utterance means or on the content of the thought. The idea that genes have meaning in 
something like the way that human thought and language have meaning is lurking in the 
background in many discussions of genetic information. For example, it has been 
suggested that under starvation conditions, human mothers methylate growth-enhancing 
genes in their children, and thus block transcription of those genes. Children with 
identical genomes and identical nutrition will reach one adult height and weight if they 
have well-nourished mothers and another if they have starving mothers. When, as in this 
case, such a response is thought to be an adaptation, it is referred to as a 'disjunctive 
genetic program' (Figure 4).  The genes contain the information ‘grow fast if your mother 
was adequately nourished, slowly if she was starved’.  
 
 
Figure 4. Norm of reaction corresponding to a ‘disjunctive genetic program’ 
 
 
However, there are innumerable cases where the norm of reaction for a trait resembles 
that in Figure 4, but where we do not talk of disjunctive programs or regard the norm of 
reaction as an expression of conditional information in the genome. These cases are the 
pathological or merely quirky effects that revealed by experiments, either those of 
developmental biologists or those of nature. The claim that the Drosophila genome 
contains the instruction ‘develop a second thorax when given an ether shock’ sounds like 
metaphor mingled with hyperbole, as does the claim that the macaque genome encodes 
the conditional instruction that a mother should kill her babies if she is raised in social 
isolation. If the concept of information in play were a causal concept, then this would be 
puzzling, since the causal information in the genome is more or less the same thing as the 
genome’s norm of reaction. If, however, the concept in play is that of intentional 
information, then it is clear why some outcomes are regarded as part of the informational 
content of the genome and others are not. The intentional content of an instruction is the 
behavior it is intended to produce, not the behavior it actually produces. No matter how 
many students ignore the instruction to write a term paper based closely on the set texts, 
the meaning of that instruction remains the same. That is why it is legitimate to deduct 
grades for not following the instruction even when it is predictable that most students will 
ignore it!. Likewise, if the human genome contains the intentional information specifying 
a normal human phenotype, then the information content of the genome is unaffected by 
the many cases of what Lorenz used to call ‘bad rearing’. In such cases, the phenotype 
misrepresents the information in the genes. 
 
In various contexts, I and others have argued that any analysis of intentional information 
that makes it part of the natural world will reveal that if genes contain intentional 
information, so do many other non-genetic developmental inputs. The molecular biologist 
Robin Knight and I have called this the ‘parity thesis’4. In this paper, however, the 
question is not whether the intentional concept of information content is legitimately 
restricted to the genes but only whether it is as a matter of fact used when discussing 
genes and not used when discussing other developmental causes. This latter claim is 
relatively uncontroversial. The fact that the intentional concept of information is used in 
this asymmetric way explains why the proposal that all developmental resources contain 
developmental information has been so controversial. As mentioned above, Maynard 
Smith has argued that only an intentional concept of information can capture the intent of 
the many biologists who have used the idea of information to distinguish what genes do 
in development from what other causes do (Maynard Smith, 2000). I will rest my case, 
therefore, with just one more example of the asymmetric treatment of genetic and non-
genetic causes. A critical temperature range in the nest plays a role in sex determination 
in crocodiles strikingly similar to that played by the SRY gene on the Y chromosome in 
mammals. Both initiate a biochemical cascade that masculinizes the fetus. Both causal 
factors are brought into existence by a complex system that has evolved to ensure that the 
masculinizing factor generates the correct sex ratio. Despite this, it is not intuitively 
correct to describe the temperature using locutions that suggest intentional information. 
Like the SRY gene, the nest temperature can ‘cause’, ‘determine’ and even ‘signal’ the 
fetus to masculinize, but it sounds odd to say that the molecular kinetic energy in the nest 
provides the fetus with information about masculinity. It seems natural to say that the 
SRY gene contains the ‘instruction’ to masculinize the fetus, but this would seem forced 
in the case of nest temperature. One might try to justify this asymmetry by arguing that 
the effect of the temperature is strongly context dependent. It is only in the very precise 
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environmental causes (Oyama, 1985). ‘Parity is the idea that genes and other material causes are on a par. 
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the chemistry of life and in both cases there seems no realistic substitute for them. But the facts of 
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templates get the role of ‘material support’ for reading DNA.’ (Griffiths & Knight, 1998: xxx). See also 
(Griffiths, 2001; Griffiths & Gray, 1997, 2001; Sterelny, Dickison, & Smith, 1996).  The obvious candidate 
for a naturalistic account of intentional information is a ‘telosemantic’ account, according to which a 
representation contains information about the state of affairs that it is an adaptation to represent (Millikan, 
1984; Papineau, 1987). 
context of a crocodile fetus that this temperature has this effect. The same, however, is 
true of the SRY gene, whose effects can be blocked by mutations affecting receptors for 
its products or by the environmental conditions in the womb whose tragic results create 
work for gender reassignment units around the world (Money, 1993). Both the 
temperature and the gene act as switches, causing certain other genes to be transcribed. 
Neither has any connection to a phenotype outside of a specific class of developmental 
systems.  
 
 
4. Intentional information and genetic determinism 
 
I have suggested that the asymmetric use of information talk can help to explain the 
persistence of genetic determinism. The proposed explanation is, in essence, very simple. 
The predominant vernacular meaning of ‘information’ is intentional information: the 
truism that the internet contains a lot of information means, not that it has a high degree 
of entropy, but that it contains a large number of intentional representations. It is a central 
feature of intentional information that it retains its identity in the face of 
misrepresentation or, in the case of imperative representations, non-compliance. This is 
what makes it possible for intentional representations to be false and for intentional 
imperatives to be disobeyed. The relationship between an intentional imperative and its 
effect is thus quite different from that between a material cause and its effect. If we 
describe a gene as a switch that initiates a cascade of gene transcription leading to, for 
example, an initial state of the brain which, under some range of environmental 
conditions, produces a behavioral preference for homosexual relationships, it is evident 
that the link between the switch and its final effect is a function of the complex causal 
system in which the switch is embedded. If the context is changed, the gene is no longer a 
switch that controls homosexuality, any more than a light switch remains a light switch 
when it is wired to an exhaust fan.  If, however, we describe the same gene as a 
genetically encoded instruction to be a homosexual, then, intuitively, the presence of 
different genes at other loci, or prenatal environments that do not support the cascade of 
gene expression, or postnatal environments that lead the brain to mature differently, all 
merely misinterpret the instruction. Furthermore, the gene retains its identity as a ‘gay 
gene’ even in an individual to which it has made some other biochemical contribution, 
and who is, phenotypically, a heterosexual. In other words, intentional information is 
intrinsically context insensitive and thus intrinsically unsuited to express the causal link 
between genes and complex phenotypes, because that link is intrinsically context 
sensitive5. 
 
                                                 
5 Sarkar has proposed that we regard phenotype as ‘genetic’ only when the phenotype itself can be 
characterized in terms of a specific molecular product, or, more usually, its absence (Sarkar, 1998). Thus, 
for example, muscular dystrophy can be defined as the inability to synthesize a key protein. The link 
between the phenotype and the loss of gene that templates for this protein is context-insensitive because the 
phenotype more or less is the loss of that template capacity. 
Representing genes as intentional imperatives that contain a representation of a phenotype 
supports genetic determinism because it allows genes to retain a link to a specific 
phenotype when they are moved from one context to another. A causal intervention that 
removes the causal pathway between a gene and the phenotype with which it was 
previously associated does not change the ‘meaning’ of the gene, it merely prevents that 
gene from being expressed. It does not put the old phenotype on a par with all the other 
phenotypes that form part of that gene’s norm of reaction.  The new phenotype with 
which the gene is associated as a result of the intervention is not the new meaning of the 
gene, it is merely a misrepresentation of the information embodied in the gene. Allowing 
genes to retain their imperative link to a particular phenotype across changes in causal 
context creates a background assumption that if the gene expressed, it will produce the 
phenotype about which it contains information.  The intentional representation of the 
gene also makes it natural to think that environments in which the gene does not ‘express’ 
its meaning are qualitatively different from those in which it does; such environments are 
somehow abnormal, or pathological because they create a mismatch between gene and 
phenotype. In all these related ways, the intentional representation of the gene supports 
the idea that genes have a constant effect across context, and hence the idea that genetic 
and environmental factors interact additively. If genes contain intentional information, 
then changing the environment either facilitates the expression of this information or 
hinders expression of the same information. This view is naturally represented by 
something like Figure 2 above, rather than Figure 3. For example, if genotype G1 in that 
figure contains the instruction ‘be intelligent’, for example, changing the environment 
merely determines the extent to which this instruction is obeyed. It cannot turn G1 into an 
instruction to be stupid, as would seem to happen in Figure 3. Thus, intentional 
representations of genes lead almost immediately to one of the central fallacies identified 
in Lewontin’s critique of behavioral genetics - the default assumption that associations 
between a gene and a phenotypic difference observed in one environment can be 
extrapolated to any other ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ environment. 
 
The intentional representation of the gene is connected to the other, more vulgar fallacies 
described in section two by various simple misunderstandings of the sort that Kitcher and 
others have observed to bedevil public understanding of genetics. If the claim that a 
behavior is 30% genetic is understood to mean that in 30% of cases studied the behavior 
can be traced back to the presence of a particular gene, then the intentional representation 
of the gene suggests that these form a ‘hard core’ of cases which will be insensitive to 
environmental variation. It is all too easy to imagine the claim that schizophrenia or 
same-sex preference is 30% genetic being understood in this way. Alternatively, if a 
continuous trait such as height or obesity is described as being 30% genetic, and of this is 
understood as partitioning the actual trait into a portion that can be ascribed to the genes 
and a portion than can be ascribed to the environment, then the intentional representation 
of the gene will suggest that, while that part of the trait due to the environment can be 
modified, the part due to the genes can only be hidden or suppressed my massive 
environmental manipulation that will be hard to sustain.  
 
 
5. Can the influence of ‘information talk’ be tested empirically?  
 
Oyama claims that representing genes and gene action in terms of information leads to 
certain errors in reasoning. In the last section, I tried to spell out some plausible ways in 
which this could occur. But Oyama’s claim is an empirical one and ought to be capable of 
empirical testing. If Oyama is correct, then there should be an association between using 
the informational concept of the gene, in which genes are type-identified by the 
developmental information they contain, and neglect of the role of contextual factors in 
gene expression. A questionnaire study conducted on eighty-one post-PhD Australia 
biologists by Karola C. Stotz and myself in 1999 produced a result that suggests that such 
an association is worth testing for more carefully (Stotz & Griffiths, In preparation). In 
that study, biologists with training and experience in developmental biology were much 
less likely to endorse the idea that the gene can be adequately defined as a unit of 
information than those with backgrounds in biochemistry and pure molecular genetics 
(Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Molecular and developmental biologists were offered a list of ‘short definitions’ 
of the gene and asked which they would endorse if forced to choose only one:  
1. That which makes the difference between two phenotypes [gene P] 
2. A nucleic acid sequence with a certain characteristic structure [structure] 
3. A nucleic acid sequence with a certain characteristic function [function] 
4. A carrier of heritable information [information] 
5. A resource for development [geneD] 
[Comments in square brackets are keys to the graph and did not appear on the 
questionnaire.] 
Association 0.553; Significance 0.008.  
 
This result is consistent with the informal comments of many biologists. For example, the 
leading developmental biologist, Scott Gilbert has remarked that:  
 
Evolutionary biologists and population geneticists treat genes as markers or 
patterns analogous to morphological characters - effectively, as modules of 
structure.  In contrast, developmental geneticists and molecular biologists see 
genes as causal agents, the basis of specific functions, or elements in networks of 
functionally interconnected units: modules of process or of function. (Gilbert, 
2001: xxx) 
 
Other results from the same study are consistent with the equally widely held view that 
developmental biologists view DNA sequences in the light of contextual factors that 
affect the expression of gene products. The responses of developmental biologists to 
questions about whether two DNA sequences are ‘the same gene’ were significantly 
influenced by information about such contextual factors. Molecular biologists without 
experience in developmental biology tended to neglect these contextual factors, in the 
sense that their survey responses were not affected by information about them. Putting 
these two results together suggests that those scientists who are least concerned with 
contextual effects on gene expression are the happiest to endorse the idea that genes are, 
fundamentally, carriers of information. Hence, I believe that there are good prospects for 
operationalizing and empirically testing the claim that the informational gene concept has 
a distorting effect on either research itself or the interpretation of research results by the 
wider community.  
 
6. The research agenda of developmental systems theory 
 
An important part of Kitcher’s critique of Oyama, and of others who argue that the 
persistence of genetic determinism has a deeper explanation, rests on the observation that, 
‘neither Lewontin’s “dialectical biology” nor Oyama’s “developmental systems theory” 
offer anything that aspiring researchers can put to work’ (Kitcher, 2001: 408). Kitcher 
argues that Oyama and Lewontin call for a radical, new approach to genetic causation 
when no such approach is available. The result, he suggests, will be to convince practical 
scientists that whatever the shortcoming of mono-causal genetic explanations, there is no 
practical alternative. In this respect, I suspect, Kitcher has been misled by the heavy 
emphasis amongst philosophers of science on evolutionary biology and evolutionary 
explanations of human behavior. There is a vast philosophical literature on this topic, 
some of the best of it by Kitcher himself (Kitcher, 1985), and in the evolutionary context, 
Kitcher’s complaint has real substance. Russell Gray and I have described the sort of 
evolutionary research that might be facilitated by a developmental systems perspective 
(Gray, 2001; Griffiths & Gray, 2001) and recent work on the evolutionary significance of 
epigenetic inheritance and niche-construction can be regarded as a partial vindication of 
these claims (Avital & Jablonka, 2001; Jablonka & Lamb, 1995; Laland, Odling-Smee, & 
Feldman, 2001; Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 1996). However, the case for the 
practical relevance of developmental systems theory is much easier to make in the 
developmental context. Until recently, philosophers of science have paid very little 
attention to developmental biology, and still less to the developmental biology of 
behavioral traits. But there is a rich experimental tradition in developmental 
psychobiology dating back several decades and developmental systems theory is to a 
large extent an attempt to make explicit and reflect on the core concepts of this research 
tradition. Developmental psychobiology might perhaps be defined as the experimental 
elucidation of the effects of genetic and environmental factors and their interactions in the 
ontogeny of gross behavioral traits. This sort of research was pioneered work in the inter-
war years by American comparative psychologists and continued after WWII in the work 
of their students and of developmentally-oriented workers in the new science of ethology, 
especially those influenced by Daniel Lehrman (Gottlieb, 2001; Johnston, 2001). 
Developmental psychobiology differs from behavioral genetics in its methodological 
emphasis on experimental intervention in the laboratory, as opposed to the descriptive-
statistical study of natural populations, a trait that places it closer to developmental 
biology. A textbook presentation of this kind of work can be found in George Michel and 
Celia Moore’s excellent Developmental Psychobiology : An interdisciplinary science 
(Michel & Moore, 1995). When I talk above of the importance of interactions between 
genes and environment, I am referring not so much to the statistical interactions revealed 
by behavioral genetics at the population level, but to the causal interactions as revealed by 
experiments in developmental psychobiology. The call to pay more attention to 
developmental interactions is not merely an appeal to complexity. Instead, it is an appeal 
to move beyond using genes as statistical markers for phenotypes and to understand them 
as biochemical causes of development. As an imperative to researchers, this can mean 
something very practical and not at all unappealing, like ‘going molecular’ and 
investigating the causes of, for example, mental illness at the level of functional 
genomics, proteomics and developmental neurobiology (Schaffner, 2001). 
 
7. Developmental systems and public understanding of science 
 
I suggest that it will be difficult to improve popular understanding of genetics while 
continuing to rely on what has so far been the main conceptual tool of popularization - the 
idea that genes are blueprints or programs. As I have argued, this formulation makes a 
deterministic reading of claims about the role of genes in development almost inevitable. 
This poses a considerable problem. ‘Information talk’ in molecular biology is not going to 
disappear in the foreseeable future. There really is a genetic code, numerous legitimate 
applications of technical notions of information play a role in research in molecular 
biology and the informal, quasi-cybernetic notions of ‘signaling’, ‘switching’ and 
‘feedback’ are the patois of molecular developmental biology. Unfortunately, the 
mathematical meaning of ‘information’ is too unintuitive and too far from the usual 
meaning of the word to become part of popular consciousness and even terms like 
‘signaling’ irresistibly suggest that what is being signaled is an intentional message. 
Hence, neither eschewing information talk not explaining it properly to a wide audience 
seems to be practicable.  
 
The only practical solution, I suggest, is the popularization of another kind of biological 
research that can act as a counterweight to popular misinterpretations of information talk. 
That counterweight ought to be developmental biology and developmental 
psychobiology. Both disciplines have the advantage that they can discuss gross 
phenotypic characters that are easily and intuitively grasped by a popular science audience 
- the carapace of the turtle, or the mutual recognition of parent and offspring in ducks. 
They explain these characters using causal, rather than informational, locutions and by 
recounting experimental interventions that often involve macro-level physical processes 
that are also relatively easy to grasp. Genes often figure in these developmental narratives 
as things activated by other factors, and those other factors are often environmental. 
Explanations of development thus automatically correct the impression that genes are 
God-like ‘prime movers themselves unmoved’. Developmental psychobiological 
explanations have a strong tendency to focus on gene-environment interactions, so they 
also automatically stress context dependence.  Fortunately, popular science writing about 
this tradition has started to appear in recent years (Bateson, 1999; Gottlieb, 1997; Moore, 
2001). It can only be hoped that some stock examples from this tradition become firmly 
entrenched in the popular imagination as a counterweight to the dim awareness that 
‘scientists have discovered’ genes for this, genes for that and the genes for other.  
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